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[L.A. No. 28919. In Bank. Oct. 30, 1967.] 
JOAN MURIEL WEINBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
FRANCIS STEPHEN WEINBERG, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Liability-Debts of Husband.-The pol-
icy of protecting the husband's creditors outweighs the policy 
of protecting family income cven from premarital creditors of 
the husband; community property is available to such credi-
tors; and as such a creditor, a husband's first wife can levy 
against the community property of his second marriage for 
alimony payments due. 
[1] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 90; Am.Jur.2d. Com-
munity Property, § 85. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 124; [2] Hus-
band and Wife, § 100; [3] Husband and Wife, § 119; [4, 5, 16] 
Husband and Wife, § 130; [6, 11] Divorce and Separation, § 230; 
[7, 8, 12, 14, 15] Divorce and Separation, § 221; [9] Divorce and 
Separation, § 233; [10] Divorce and Separation, § 235; [13] 
Divorce and Separation, § 237(3); [17] Divorce and Separation, 
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[2] Id.-Property-Management and Control of Community Prop-
erty.-As manager of the community property with like abso-
lute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has 
of his separate estate (Civ. Code, § 172), the husband may 
voluntarily discharge his obligation for alimony payments due 
to his first wife from 'the community property of his second 
marriage. 
[3] Id. - Liability - Community Property. - With certain 
exceptions, the California community property system is based 
on the principle that all debts which are not specifically made 
the obligations of the wife are grouped together as the obliga-
tions of the husband and the community property. 
[4] Id. - Liability - Oommunity Property - Reimbursement for 
Advances.-The community of a husband and his second wife 
ean claim reimbursement from the husband's separate estate 
when community property has been used to discharge a hus-
lland's. obligation for alimony payments due his first wife 
where such obligations were incurred before his second mar-
riage and represented a continuing obligation based on both 
his community and separate incomes, where during his second 
. marriage the parties' net worth substantially increased but 
• only 17 percent of which was community property, it being 
! unjust under such circumstances to the second wife to allow 
i her husband to preserve his separate estate by using only 
,community funds to meet alimony payments SUbstantially 
based on his large separate income. 
[6] Id. - Liability - Community Property - Reimbursement for 
Advances.-An apportionment of the husband's alimony and 
child support obligations to his first wife between his separate 
income and the income of community property of a second 
marriage should be made and the husband's total separate and 
community income during the period of his second marriage 
should be used to determine the proportionate amounts that 
his separate and community property will be charged where, 
although his earnings from separate property were sufficient 
to pay the whole, it would be inequitable to charge the obliga-
tions wholly to his separate property, since the obligations 
were continuing and based in part on his community earnings; 
and in determining the proportion, his separate income must 
include capital increases in investments, even though gains are 
not realized. 
[6] Divorce and Separation-Disposition of Oommunity Property. 
-In determining the property rights of the parties in a 
divorce action, no adjustment for the benefit either party 
received from deductions for alimony paid to the husband's 
first wife and taken on joint income tax returns of the hus-
band and his second wife had to be made where no specific 
computation of the actual benefit to the second wife or detri-
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ment to the husband appeared, but the record showed that 
both parties shared the benefit of the deductions for such 
alimony taken on joint tax returns. 
[7] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of 
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties 
in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in finding that a 
portion of the increase in value of stock in small closely held 
corporations owned by the husband at the time of marriage 
was attributable to a growth of 7 percent per annum as a fair 
return on his investment, and that the balance of the increase 
in value was attributable to the husband's labor and skill and 
therefore community property, the trial court correctly adopt-
ing the rate of legal interest in the absence of evidence of 
current returns, and disregarding the effect of inflation and 
other economic factors where the husband offered no evidence 
thereon. 
[8] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Cha.racter of 
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties 
in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in finding profits 
and accruals in excess of the husband's separate property 
investment and interest thereon to be community property 
attributable to defendant's efforts although he had only with-
drawn part of that excess in the form of salary payments, and 
in not making an adjustment for tax obligations that might 
have been but were not incurred by the husband had addi-
tional salary been withdrawn by him from the business. 
[9] ld.-Disposition of Community Property-Division Equally 
Between the Parties.-In determining the property rights of 
the parties in a divorce action, the community property must 
be divided equally between the husband and wife where both 
parties were awarded a divorce. 
[10] ld. - Disposition of Community Property - Decree. - In 
determining the property rights of the parties in a divorce 
action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
.,a money judgment for the value of the wife's interest in the 
·capital stock of certain closely held corporations' instead of 
ordering a stock distribution to her, where, although there 
would be tax consequences if defendant satisfied the judgment 
by withdrawing funds from the corporations or selling some of 
his stock, there was no indication that he needed or intended 
to do either to satisfy the judgment, the trial court not being 
required to speculate as to tax consequences that might or 
might not arise after the division of the community property. 
[11] ld. - Disposition of Community Property. - In determining 
the property rights of the parties in a divorce action, the trial 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment, 
§ 170 et seq. i Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 925 et seq. 
, , . ; ~ 
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court did not err in failing to consider possible tax conse-
quences involved where there was no showing of immediate 
and specific tax liability tv either party. 
[12] Id.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of 
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties 
in a divorce action, the evidence supported the trial court's 
finding that defendant's efforts were minimal within the mean-
ing of the rule that an apportionment of profits is required 
not only when the husband conducts a commercial enterprise 
but also when he invests separate funds in securities, and that 
the proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely 
to the husband's separate estate only when they are attrib-
utable solely to the natural enhancement of the property or 
when the husband expended only minimal effort, where the 
record showed that from the time of his marriage until he 
severed connection with certain corporations except as a 
shareholder, defendant spent virtually all of his time and 
efforts -in the management of other business affairs and that, 
while defendant owned 50 percent of the stock in the corpora-
tions, the other major stockholder directed the business affairs 
of such corporations, the husband devoting little time to their 
affairs or management, and generally participating only to a 
limited extent in policy decisions. 
[IS] Id.-Disposition of Community Property-Review-Evidence 
to Support Judgment.-In determining the property rights of 
the parties in a divorce action, the trial court did not err in 
not allocating any of the increase in value in the husband's 
investment in a group of corporations to the community where 
although his efforts were minimal in connection with corpo-
rate affairs, the wife was entitled to introduce other evidence 
that they were of measurable value but did not do so.' 
[14] Id.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Character of 
Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties 
in a divorce action, the trial court was justified in finding that 
the husband segregated his community income in one bank 
account and kept it apart from his separate income which he 
deposited in a different bank and that any increase in the 
latter account, although not entirely accounted for, was from 
separate property where defendant's only community income, 
apart from interests in various trust funds and increases in 
the value of his businesses, was salary income, and there was 
no evidence of community funds received by him from any 
other source, and where defendant testified that he deposited 
all his salary checks in the community income account and 
there was no evidence that community funds were deposited 
elsewhere nor that disbursements for community purposes 
were made out of his separate ~ccount rather than the com-
munity account. 
' .. 
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[15] ld.-Disposition of Property-Determination of Oharacter of 
,Property.-In determining the property rights of the parties 
in a divorce action, the trial court c-rrcd in finding that a fund 
received by the wife in settlement of a cause of action for 
personal injuries remained her separate property where the 
wife indorsed and delivered to her husband the check received 
in settlement and the husband deposited in a community 
account, thereafter transferring the money to a joint checking 
account used by both parties to pay community expenses, it 
being presumed under such circumstances that the wife made 
a gift to the community. 
[16] Husband and Wife-Liability-Oommunity Property-Reim-
bursements for Advances.-A party to a marriage who uses 
separate property for community purposes is entitled to reim-
bursement from the community or separate property of the 
other party only if there is an agreement between them to 
that effect. 
[17] Divorce and Separation-Oounsel Fees--Discretion of Oourt . 
. -In awarding counsel fees to a wife in a' divorce action, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife 
legal fees out of the separate property of the husband for 
under Civ. Code, § 137.3, giving thE' court discretion to order 
payment of such amount as may be reasonably necessary for 
attorney fees without regard to available sources, the trial 
court need not require a wife to resort to her own capital for 
payment of her counsel before ordering her husband to pay 
attorney fees even when the wife has separate property in 
addition to community property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Kurtz Kauffman, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action for divorce. Portion of judgment adjudicating the 
property rights of the parties and awarding alimony reversed 
with directions; in other respects judgment affirmed. 
Ward & Heyler and Charles A. Druten for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Edward Sumner for Defendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Both parties appeal from an interlocu-
tory judgment granting a divorce to each, awarding alimony 
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d Rev., Divorce, Separation and Annulment, 
§ 82, et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Spearation, § 571 et seq. 
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tn plaintiff wife, determining the property rights of the 
parties, and awarding fees and costs. Neither party challenges 
the part of the judgment granting the divorce, but each 
contends that in other respects the trial court committed vari-
ous errors. 
Plaintiff and defendant married on June 2, 1959, and sep-
arated on October 30, 1963. They have no children. Plaintiff 
had virtually no property at the time of the marriage. 
Defendant's net worth was $489:208.19, including all of the 
shares of All Metal Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engineering 
Corporation, 50 percent of the shares of Airborne Electronics 
Corporation, interests in employee profit sharing and retire-
ment plan trust funds of two of the corporations, and several" 
checking accounts. The trial court found that the net worth of 
both parties increased during the marriage to not less than 
$2.487,928.08, of which $338,164.93 was community property. 
Defendant has two cllildren by a previous marriage, which 
also ended in divorce. The decree in that case awarded cus-
tody of the children to defendant's former wife, incorporated 
a property settlement agreement, and ordered defendant to 
I pay $1,800 per month alimony and $600 per month child sup-
port. During his second marriage defendant used community 
funds to pay the alimony and child support. The trial court 
held that defendant must reimburse the community for the 
alimony payments but that the child support was an obliga-
tion he could charge against the community estate. Plaintiff 
contends that neither the alimony nor the child support pay-
ments benefited the community and that therefore both should 
have been charged against defendant's separate property. 
Defendant contends that both obligations were debts he was 
entitled to discharge from community property. (See Civ. 
Code, § 172; Grolem'und v. Caffe-rata (1941) 17, Ca1.2d679, 
688 [111 P.2d 641].) 
[1] The policy of protecting the husband's creditors out-
weighs the policy of protecting family income even from pre': 
marital creditors of the husband. Community property is 
therefore available to such creditors. (Grolemund v. Cafferata, 
supra, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 689; Nichols v. Mitchell (1948) 32 Cal. . 
:!d 598, 610 [197 P.2d 550]; Odone v. Marzocchi (1949.) 34 
Ca1.2d 431, 440 [211 P.2d 297, 212 P.2d 233, 17 A.L.R.2d 
]]09].) As such a creditor, a husband's first wife can levy 
against the community property of his second marriage· for· 
alimony payments due. (Bruton v. Tearle (1936) 7 Ca1.2d 48, 
57 [59 P.2d 953, 106 A.L.R. 580] ; Yager v. Yager (1936) 'J 
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Ca1.2d 213, 220 [60 P.2d 422, 106 A.L.R. 664].) [2] As 
manager of the community property , , with like absolute 
power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his 
separate estate" (Civ. Code, § 172), the husband may also 
voluntarily discharge such obligations from community prop-
erty. In California, there are ordinarily no separate as distin-
guished from community debts of the husband. [3] With 
exceptions not relevant here, "our community system is based 
_upon the principle that all debts which are not specifically 
made the obligation of the wife are grouped together as the 
obligations of the husband and the community property." 
(Grolem1tnd v. Caf/erata, s-upra, 17 Ca1.2d 679, 688.) [4] It 
does not follow, however, that the community can never claim 
reimbursement from the husband's separate estate when com-
munity property has been used to discharge a husband's obli-
gation. The husband's legal right of management and control 
has long been recognized to imply correlative duties to his 
wife. His duties are analogous to those of a. partner; he can-
not obtain an unfair advantage from the trust placed in him 
as a result of the marital relationship. (Vai v. Bank of Amer-
-_ica (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 329, 337-339 [15 Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 
247]; Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 443, 447-448 
[205 P.2d 402].) Thus, in Provost v. Pt'ovost (1929) 102 Cal. 
App.775 [283 P. 842], the community was held to be entitled 
-. to reimbursement to the extent of community funds used by 
the husband for the improvement of his separate property. 
"To hold otherwise would be to permit the authority of the 
husband in controlling the community property, given him in 
the interest of greater freedom in its use and for its transfer 
for the benefit of both himself and his wife, to become a 
weapon to be used by him to rob her of every vestige of 
interest ill the community property with which the law has 
expressly invested her. Such a conclusion would violate every 
sense of justice, and outrage every principle of fair dealing 
known -to the law. The provisions of our code do not require 
us to so hold, nor do the prior decisions of this jurisdiction 
compel or warrant a ruling which would thus_ uphold the 
marital marauding of the wife's estate .... " (Provost v. 
Provost, supra, 102 Cal.App. 775, 781; see also Estate of Tur-
ne-r (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 576, 580 [96 P.2d 363]; lVhite v. 
, White (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 524, 530 [79 P.2d 759].) 
-, Like considerations are present here. Defendant's alimony 
_ and child support obligations were incurred before 11is second 
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based on both his community and separate incomes. (Webber 
v. Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 160 (199 P.2d 934]; Mueller 
v. Mueller (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 253 [301 P.2d 90J; 
Civ. Code, § 139.) During the second marriage the parties' 
net worth increased by approximately $2,000,000) of which 
only $338,000 was community property. Under these circum-
stances, it would be unjust to plaintiff to allow defendant to 
preserve his separate estate by using only community funds to 
meet alimony and child support obligations totaling more 
than $130,000 that were substantially based on his large sep-
arate income. 
[6] An apportionment of defendant's alimony and child 
support obligations between his separate income and the com-
munity income is both practical and fair. Defendant's total 
separate and community income during the period of his sec-
ond marriage should be used to determine the proportionate 
a.mounts ihat his separate and community property will be 
charged. Although his earnings from separate property are 
sufficient to pay the whole, it would be inequitable to charge 
the obligations wholly to his separate income, since the obliga-
tions are continuing and based in part on his community 
earnings. In determining the proportion, however, his separate 
income· must include capital increases in investments, even 
though the gains are not realized, for otherwise defendant 
would be free to use unrealized capital gains to deplete the 
community for the benefit of his personal estate. 
[6] Defendant contends that plaintiff received an income 
tax benefit from alimony expense deductions, and that the 
actual depletion of the community estate was therefore the net 
after-tax cost of the payments, not the gross amount of the 
payments. No specific computation of the actual benefit to 
plaintiff or detriment to defendant appears, but the record 
shows that both parties shared the benefit of the deductions 
for alimony, which were taken on joint tax returns. Defend-
ant had the option of filing a separate return or a joint return 
and could choose whichever h~ felt was the. most advanta-
~eous. That choice did not depend on whether defendant paid 
the alimony from separate or community income. Had the 
payments been correctly alloc·ated against separate and com-
munity property, the tax would have been the same. Accord-
ingly, no adjustment for the benefit either party received 
from the alimony tax deduction need be made. 
[7] At the time of his second marriage, defendant owned 
all the stock of All Metal Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engi-
Oct. 1967] WEINBERG V. WEINBERG 
[67 C.2d 557; 83 Cal.Rptr. 13. 432 P.2d 709] 
565 
neering Corporation, worth approximately $130,000. The trial 
court found that during the marriage the value of the stock 
increased by approximately $225,000 and that $95,000 of the 
increase could be attributed to growth of 7 percent per annum 
8S a fair return on investment. (Pereira v. Pereira (1909) 156 
Cal. 1, 11-12 [103 P. 488, 134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A. N.S. 
880].) It found that the balance of $160,000 was attributable 
to defendant's labor and skill, and was therefore community 
property. It ordered defendant to pay plaintiff half the bal-
ance in money. (See De Burgh v. De Burgh (19.52) 39 Cal.2d 
858, 874 [250 P.2d 598] ; Webster v. Webstet· (1932) 216 Cal. 
485,488 [14 P.2d 522].) 
Defendant contends that a 7 percent return is not currently 
considered to be a fair or adequate return on risk capital 
invested in a small, closely held corporation and that the 
increase in net worth of his wholly owned corporation was 
partially attributable to inflation and other general economic 
and business factors. Since he offered no evidence of current 
returns, however, the trial court correctly adopted the rate of 
legal interest. (Pereira v. Pereira, supra, 156 Cal. 1, 11-12; cf. 
Tassi v. Tassi (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 680, 691 [325 P.2d 
872].) Since he also offered no evid~nce of the effect of infla-
tion and other economic factors on his corporations, the trial 
court properly disregarded those factors; (Cf. Logan v. For-
ster (1952) 144 Cal.App.2d 587, 601 [250 P.2d 730].) 
. [8] Defendant raises a number of contentions concerning 
the tax consequences of liquidating his interests to pay his 
wife her share of the community estate. He bases some of 
these contentions on an erroneous statement of the trial 
court's findings. The trial court found profits and accruals in 
excess of defendant's separate property investment and inter-
est thereon to be community property attributable to defend-
ant's efforts, although he had only withdrawn part of that 
exceSs in the form of salary payments. Defendant assumes 
that the trial court found that he had neglected to withdraw 
"adequate" salaries from his wholly owned corporations. He 
contends that adequate withdrawals would have been taxed at 
a 70· percent rate, and concludes th~t plaintiff is entitled to 
. only half the remaining 30 percent. The trial court was not 
concerned, however, with whetheto defendant paid himself an 
"adequate" salary, but only with what proportion of the 
business was community property. That proportion was not 







566 WEINBERG V. WEINBERG [67 C.2d 
[9] Since both parties were awarded a divorce, the com-
munity property must be divided equally. (De Burgh v. De 
Burgh, supra, 39 Cal.2d 858, 874.) Defendant contends that 
the award to plaintiff of a money jUdgment for half the value 
of the community interest in his wholly owned corporations 
resulted in an unequal division, because liquidation of the 
assets requires payment of income taxes and will leave him 
with substantially less than the amount awarded to plaintiff. 
Such taxes, he asserts, should be paid out of community 
assets. l 
[10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in award-
ing a money judgment for the value of plaintiff's interest 
instead of ordering a stock distribution to her. (Webster v. 
Webster, supra, 216 Cal. 485, 488; Dallman v. Dallman 
(1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 815, 819 [331 P.2d 245].)2 Although 
there will be tax consequences if defendant satisfies the judg-
Dlent by withdrawing funds from the corporations or selling 
some of his atock, there is no indication that he must or 
intends to do either to satisfy the judgment. He may choose to 
borrow the money or make the payments out of other prop-
erty. Of course, once the property is divided pursuant to the 
trial court's order, the future tax consequences may vary on 
further sale or liquidation from what they would have been 
had the property been divided differently. The trial court 
need not speculate on such possibilities, however, or consider 
tax consequences that mayor may not arise after the division 
of the community property. (Cf. Harley v. Whitmore (1966) 
242 Cal.App.2d 461, 471 [51 Cal.Rptr. 468] ; Greene v. Wilson 
~1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 852,856 [25 Cal.Rptr. 630] ; Mayberry 
v. Whittier (1904) 144 Cal. 322, 325 [78 P. 16].) 
[11] Plaintiff and defendant briefly set forth several 
other contentions regarding the tax effects of the trial court's 
lThe trial court refused to take taxes into account on the ground that 
defendant introduced no evidence of their effect. The record indicates, 
however, that defendant first received notice that the court would award 
a money judgment in lieu of a division of stock when proposed findings 
were prepared. 
2Although the trial court might properly have given defendant the 
option of either conveying some of his stock to plaintiff or paying a 
money judgment, its failure to award stock to plaintiff was not an abuse 
of discretion, despite her interest in retaining an investment in the 
profitable businesses. The corporations were defendant's wholly owned 
separate property at the time of bis remarriage; the increase in value 
was the result in large part of his personal skill and efforts. It is unlikely 
that the corporation could operate effectively with control split between 
recently divorced spouses, nnd defendant had adequate separate property 
to satisfy a money judgment. 
J 
) 
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award. None is supported by a sufficient showing of immediate 
Rnd" specific tax liability to establish any error in the trial 
court's failure to consider the possible tax consequences 
involved. 
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erroneously held 
the increase in value of defendant's investment in five related 
corporations (the "Hamilton Group") to be entirely separ-
ate property. In March 1958, defendant purchased 50 percent 
of the outstanding stock in Airborne Electronics for $1,000; 
by the time of his remarriage it was worth $57,212.91. During 
the first 18 months of his second marriage, defendant pur-
chased 40 percent of the issued and outstanding shares in 
Hamilton Electro Sales for $4,000, 50 percent of the outstand-
ing shares in Electro Ad Agency for $500, 25 percent of the 
issued shares in Hamilton Electronics for $1,250, and 40 per-
cent of the issued shares in Hamilton Electric Sales-North for 
$1,000. In October 1961, Airborne Electronics changed its 
name to Hamilton Electro Corporation and acquired all of 
defendant's stock in the five corporations in exchange for 
241,200 shares of Hamilton Electro stock. In October 1961, 
defendant sold 27,500 shares for $187,687.50. In November 
1962, the assets and stock of Hamilton Electro Corporation 
were acquired by A vnet Electronics Corporation and defend-
ant received 106,850 shares of Avnet stock. In February 
1963, he sold 26,700 shares for $550,594.26. At the time of the 
trial defendant owned 83,374 shares of Avnet stock with a 
market value of $1,073,440.25. Cash dividends during his sec-
ond marriage totaled $60,643.98. 
[12] It is undisputed that defendant invested his separate 
property in the Hamilton Group and rendered some services 
to the five corporations involved. The trial court found, how-
ever, that" no portion of the increase in the value of the stock 
of said corporations is attributable to defendant's personal 
character, energy, ability, capacity or services; that defendant 
expended only a minimal effort; that there is no evidence 
attributing a value to defendant's services; and that the same 
is the separate property of defendant. " 
" An apportionment of profits is required not only when the 
.husband conducts a commercial enterprise but also when he 
. invests separate funds in real estate or securities. [Citations.] 
The proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely 
" to the husband's separate estate" only when they are attrib-
utable solely to the natural enhancement of the property 
[citations] or when the husband expended only minimal effort 
~ .. ) 
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and the wife introduced no evidence attributing a value to his 
sr.rvkes. (Cozzi v. Oozzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232 [183 P.2d 
,39]; Estate of Barnes, 128 Cal.App. 489, 492 [17 P.2d 
1046].)" (Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 733, 740-741 
[22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745].) The evidence supports the 
trial court's finding that defendant's efforts were minimal 
within the meaning of the foregoing rule. 
The record shows that from the time of his remarriage until 
he severed his connection with A vnet Electronics except as a 
shareholder, defendant spent virtually all of his time and 
efforts in the management of the business affairs of All Metal 
Fabricators, Inc. and Alpha Engineering Corporation. 
Defendant owned all the stock in these two corporations and 
served as president and director of each. Defendant owned 
only 50 percent of the shares of the Hamilton Group, and the 
other major stockholder, Tony Hamilton, directed the business 
affairs of the five corporations. Although defendant assisted in 
setting up several of. the corporations and was given the title 
of vice-president and director of each of the five corporations, 
and although he later assumed the title of president of Ham-
ilton Electro Corporation for one fiscal year, he attended only 
a few board meetings of the latter and none of the other four 
corporations, and devoted no time to their affairs or manage-
ment. He received no salary except from Hamilton Electro 
Corporation, for which he devoted "perhaps an hour a 
week," usually during the lunch hour, to its affairs; he had 
no desk, telephone, clerical help, or office facilities. The hour 
was spent mainly consulting with Mr. Hamilton. He assisted 
in obtaining a bank loan for Hamilton Electro Corporation, 
and discussed with Mr. Hamilton whether or not to place the 
banker on its board of directors, but generally he participated 
only to a "limited extent" in policy decisions. He and Ham-
ilton had the idea of reorganization and public offering, but 
this work was done primarily by a law firm. The acquisition 
of the Hamilton Group assets was initiated by A vnet and 
carried out by negotiations between it and Tony Hamilton; 
although defendant took a trip to New York in connection 
with the transaction, Hamilton took care of "most 'of the 
stuff" relative to the A VIlet acquisition. 
[13] Even though defendant's efforts were minimal, 
plaintiff was entitled to introduce other evidence that they 
were nevertheless of measurable value. (Kenney v. Kewney 
(1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 139 [274 P.2d 951].) Since she 
did not do so, however, the trial court did Dot err in not 
-.~ 
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allocating any of the increase in value in defendant's invest-
ment in the Hamilton Group to the community. (Estate of 
Neilson, supra, 57 Cal.2d 733, 740-741.) 
[14] Plaintiff next contends that the evidence does not 
support the trial court's finding that assets acquired with 
funds from an account with Security First National Bank 
were defendant's separate property. At the time of his remar-
riage, defendant had $793.88 in a checking account in the 
Santa Monica Bank. During the marriage he made deposits 
totaling $262,507.91, either directly or through a savings 
account that he subsequently opened in the same bank. Plain-
tiff was authorized to draw checks on the checking account, 
and did so during the marriage. Both parties used the accoun t 
for items such as living expenses, taxes, alimony, child sup-
port, and medical expenses. The trial court found the $113.43 
balance in the Santa Monica account to be community prop-
erty. At the time of his remarriage, defendant also had a 
balance of $31,235.07 in a checking account in the Security 
First National Bank. Plaintiff was never authorized to draw 
checks against this account and never did so. During the mar-
riage, defendant made a number of deposits in the Security 
Bank account. He could not identify the sources of the depos-
its made between June 2, 1959, and November 16, 1961, dur-
ing which time he made several investments in stocks with 
funds withdrawn from the Security Bank account. Plaintiff 
contends that the separate funds originally on deposit with 
the Security Bank at the time of the marriage were exhausted 
by October 31, 1959, and that because deposits to the account 
were not identified or traced, defendant has not carried the 
burden of overcoming the presumption that the deposits were 
community property. (Civ. Code, § 164, Estate of Sehabiaguc 
(1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 793, 798 [119 P.2d 30]; Estate of 
Boody (1896) 113 Cal. 682, 687 [45 P. 858] ; Estate of Dun-
can (1937) 9 Cal.2d 207, 217 [70 P.2d 174].) Accordingly, 
plaintiff contends that the stocks purchased with funds from 
the account between June 2, 1959, and November 16, 1961, are 
community assets. (Pope v. Pope (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 353, 
362 [227 P.2d 867].) 
The evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption and sup-
port the trial court's finding that the funds in the Security 
.Bank account were defendant's separate property. Defend-
ant's only community income, apart from interests in various 
.. trust funds and increases in the value of his businesses, was 
salary income, and there is no evidence of community funds 
: ~ 
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received by defendant from any other source. Defendant testi-
fied that he deposited aU his salary checks in the Santa Mon-
ica Bank, either in the checking or savings account. There is 
no evidence that community funds were deposited elsewhere, 
nor is there evidence that disbursements for community pur-
poses were made out of the Security Bank account rather than 
the Santa Monica Bank account. An exhibit prepared by 
defendant's accountant, which compares his net salaries to 
deposits in the Santa Monica Bank from June 1959 to June 
1963, shows that in two years deposits were greater than the 
salaries and in the other two years deposits were less than the 
$70,000 per year salaries by only approximately $10,000; over 
the four-year period total salary income was $260,391.04 and 
total deposits were $262,507.91. The trial court was justifi~d 
in finding that defendant segregated his community income in 
the Santa Monica Bank account and kept it apart from his 
separate iI1come, which he deposited in a different bank, and 
that any increase in defendant's Security Bank account, 
although not entirely accounted for, was from separate prop-
erty. (Civ. Code, § 163.) 
[15a] Defendant next contests the trial court's award of 
$4,400 to plaintiff as separate property. Plaintiff received a 
$4,400 check in settlement of a cause of action for personal 
injuries, which she indorsed and delivered to defendant. He 
deposited it in his Santa Monica Bank savings account, which 
was a community account, and thereafter the money was 
transferred to the Santa Monica joint checking account used 
by both panies to pay commumty expenses. Under these cir-
cumstances plaintiff must be presumed to have made a gift of 
the $4,400 to the community, for" a wife who uses her separ-
ate funds in payment of family expenses without agreement 
regarding repayment cannot require her husband to reimburse 
her. [Citations.] . .. [16] The basic rule is that the party 
who uses his separate property for community purposes is 
entitled to reimbursement from the community or separate 
property of the other only if there is an agreement between 
the parties to that effect." (See v. See (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 778, 
785 [51 Cal.Rptr. 888,415 P.2d 776].) 
[15b] Plaintiff contends that the separate fund was en-
trusted to defendant as a fiduciary and that since she did not 
transfer the money from the savings account to the checking 
account, she did not knowingly use her separate funds in pay-
ment of family expenses. She therefore concludes that no pre-
sumption of a gift arose. rfhere is no support in the record for 
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plaintiff's contention that she turned the money over to defend-
ant merely for safekeeping. Plaintiff testified that" I haven't 
the foggiest notion how much [the settlement] was. Frank took 
the money. I asked him what it was, and everything, and he 
said, 'Why do you need it Y' He said I am a rich woman, so he 
put it in his own account." Plaintiff knew the source of the 
money, and consented voluntarily to its disposition by 
defendant on the ground that she did not need it. She cannot 
now complain because the money was used by both defendant 
and herself to pay community expenses. She imposed no 
restrictions on how the money was to be used, and there was 
no agreement regarding reimbursement. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in finding that the fund remained separate prop-
erty. (See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d 778,785.) 
[17] Defendant finally attacks the trial court's order to 
pay plaintiff's $20,000 legal fees out of his separate property. 
(CiV'. Code, § 137.3.) Defendant contends that plaintiff's 
attorney's fees should have been charged against the com-
m~nity property before it was distributed. He relies on the 
statement in Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 33 Cal.2d 107, 113 [199 
P.2d 671], that the theory behind such an award is to com-
pensate the wife for the husband's use of the community 
estate to pay his attorney. Section 137.3 of the Civil Code is 
not so limited, for it gives the coprt discretion to order pay-
ment of "such amount as may be reasonably necessary ... for 
attorney's fees' , without regard to the available sources. 
Even when the wife has separate property in addition to com-
munity property, the trial court need not require her to resort 
to her own capital for payment of her counsel before ordering 
her husband to pay attorney's fees. (Orevolin v. Orevolin 
(1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 565, 572-573 [31 Cal.Rptr. 622] ; Sig-
esmund v. Sigesmund (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 628. 632 [252 
P.2d 713] ; Primm v. Primm (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 690, 696 [299 
P.2d 231].) Here plaintiff had no separate property. No abuse 
of discretion appears. 
Since the trial court erred in allocating the child support 
and alimony payments between separate and community 
property and in awarding plaintiff the $4,400 representing 
her personal injury damages, the judgment must be reversed 
insofar as it adjudicates the property rights of the parties. 
Since the award of alimony may have been based in part on 
the division of property, it must also be reversed. The parts of 
t~e judgment determining the property rights of the parties 
and awarding alimony are reversed. The other parts of the 
) 
judgment are affirmed. The trial court is direeted to amend its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in accord with the 
views expressed herein, to redetermine the amount of alimony, 
and to enter the appropriate judgment. Plaintiff shall recover 
costs on these appeals. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
The petition of defendant and appellant for a rehearing was 
denied November 29, 1967. 
